Hosts can be classified into two main genotypes according to their ability to respond 1 0 0 to a pathogen. Susceptible hosts are completely vulnerable to pathogens and not able to mount We consider a variety of response strategies that resistant hosts can mount against whereas an inducible response is only expressed upon infection. A given host can express a 1 0 8 mixture of these two strategies, where the ratio of investment in constitutive response is 1 0 9 defined as r1 (in other words, if r1=1, then the response is strictly constitutive, and 1 1 0 conversely, strictly inducible when r1= 0). The constitutive immune response, being expressed at all times, is considered here 1 1 2 equivalent to a barrier to infection. Thus, in our model, the constitutive immune response (1-cR) = (1-c1)*(1-c2).
(Eq. 3) 1 6 7
In Eq. 3 and 4, both m1 and m2 represent the departure from linearity. The higher their 1 6 8 value is, the lower the cost is at low levels of investment, i.e. efficacy. A list of model 1 6 9
parameters, along with their definition and the range of explored values, is given in Table 1 . 
characterized by a probability of infection, denoted β , that is a measure of the parasite' host is reduced by a factor (1-eff2*(1-r2)).
0
For a given uninfected host, the probability of infection is then calculated as the 2 2 1 probability of successful transmission by at least one of its infected neighbours. A 2 2 2 random number between 0 and 1 (uniform distribution) is then drawn and if it is lower 2 2 3 than this probability of infection, transmission occurs. Resistant individuals expressing 2 2 4 a constitutive response with efficacy eff1 have a probability to become infected that is the other hand, have the same probability to be infected than the susceptible ones. Table   2 2 7 3 describes the pairwise probability of infection of a host X by a host Y. affected by the investment in the inducible defence and in this latter case, the recovery 2 3 5 rate becomes:
In a similar manner as for the previous events, if the recovery rate is lower than a 2 3 8 randomly drawn number chosen between 0 and 1, then the individual remains infected. In each simulation, the lattice is initially populated with 1000 individuals of the 2 4 2 susceptible genotype including 20% of infected, all randomly distributed between sites.
4 3
The simulation is first run for 1000 time steps to allow the resident population to In the first two scenarios, we only explored the effect of space on the spread of 2 5 1 one type of resistance alone, first the constitutive one, then the inducible one. To do so 2 5 2 the r1 parameter was respectively set to 1 then 0. We varied the cost associated with the epidemiology of the disease. As mentioned earlier constitutive resistance is associated with a fixed cost (paid 2 5 9
by both infected and non-infected individuals). As there is only a single type of 2 6 0 resistance involved, the value of this cost is cMax1. We observe that for all 2 6 1 neighbourhood sizes a moderately high cost (cost>0.1) precludes the spread of resistance is not costly. In those instances, the parasite is then always eliminated from case the resistant genotype is then unsurprisingly lost as a consequence of this cost. The size of the neighbourhood affects both resistance spread and parasite 2 6 8 dynamics. We observe that, for a given cost, resistance can spread to higher frequencies 2 6 9 when neighbourhood size is larger ( Figure 1A ). These results are confirmed with a 2 7 0 simple statistical analysis ( Additionally, we observe that in larger neighbourhoods, parasites can be 2 8 5 eliminated from the population at higher values of cost of resistance. It is noteworthy 2 8 6 that parasites are eliminated at a higher speed for low values of the cost of resistance 2 8 7
( Figure 1B ). and of the size of neighbourhood on the speed of elimination of a parasite. are built for each size of neighbourhood with the points for which the parasite is 2 9 6 still present. As mentioned in the Methods, in the case of inducible defence, we explore two 3 0 0 distinct mechanisms, either blocking forward transmission (reducing β ) or boosting 3 0 1 recovery (increasing γ ). The ratio of the investment in each mechanism is given by r2, The size of the neighbourhood has a strong impact on the spread of this type of 3 0 8
resistance (Table 5 ). We observe that when the cost of resistance increases, resistance 3 0 9 spreads more easily in smaller neighbourhoods (S1 Figure) . The resistant genotype can be maintained in our simulations with relatively high
values of the cost of resistance only in the smallest neighbourhood (size 1 and 2) and
only in simulations where the parasites are eventually lost from the population. In the 3 2 0 largest neighbourhoods resistance cannot become fixed and can only spread when it is 3 2 1 not costly, while parasites can maintain especially when resistance is costly (Table 6 ). With this type of inducible defence, we observe that the interaction between the 3 3 0 cost of resistance and the size of the neighbourhood significantly affects the spread of resistance (Table 7) . We now consider the case of a fluctuating investment of the resistant hosts 3 6 1 between the two inducible responses, the transmission-blocking and the recovery- boosting one. In other words, this means that r2 can take values between 0 and 1. With such mixed strategies, resistance can spread in the population and reach a pathogen on its spread in different spatial structure and on the parasite prevalence interesting to observe that a strategy mixing these two mechanisms generally favours 3 8 0 costly resistance in more highly structured populations (i.e. smaller neighbourhoods).
8 1
Once the cost of resistance increases, it appears that a ratio biased towards the recovery 3 8 2 response is favoured over the transmission-blocking response. neighbourhoods, only the cost and the ratio alone influence the presence of resistance 3 8 7 (Table 9 ) and the selected strategy is the one favouring recovery response (Figure 3 ). and a recovery component against a pathogen on its spread in different spatial reproduction rate rH=0.02, efficacy of resistance eff1=1, departure from linearity where 0 < r1 <1. 3.1. Mixing a constitutive and a recovery-boosting response (0 < r1 < 1 and r2=1 neighbourhood and its interaction with the ratio do have a strong impact (Table 9) . Thus, for a given ratio, resistance spreads to a higher frequency when the size of the boosting resistance on the spread of resistance at different sizes of neighbourhood.
2 7
The graph presents also the parasite presence at equilibrium.
2 8
The parameters are the following ones: transmission rate β =0.25, virulence of the 4 2 9 pathogen alpha=0.25, mortality µ=0.01, recovery rate γ =0.1, reproduction rate When the value of r1 remains below a certain threshold (i.e. a higher investment 4 5 5
in the inducible, transmission-blocking response) resistance can spread for the small- the parasite is maintained. (S3 Figure) . (0 < r1 < 1 and 0 < r2 < 1 We find that the outcome of the simulations (in terms of presence or absence of 4 6 5 resistance at the end of a simulation) is primarily affected by the ratios r1 and r2 of the interaction with r1 (Table 11 ). For the different sizes of neighbourhood, 3 different outcomes can occur ( Figure   4 7 5 6). parameters, respectively the frequency of resistance and the prevalence. The parameters are the following ones: transmission rateβ=0.25, virulence of the For low values of r1, the fixed cost of resistance is limited and resistance can combination of both inducible defence mechanisms is most advantageous. Finally, we 5 0 0 note that at very high values of r1, resistance is always lost from the population. investment strategies, and the respective selective pressures associated with these 5 0 5 different types of resistance can be correspondingly diverse. In this study, we elucidate 5 0 6
Mixing all three resistance mechanisms
how these mechanisms of resistance can be differentially selected, not only based on the 5 0 7
way the response to a pathogen is mounted (inducible or constitutive resistance), but 5 0 8 also based on the specific trait of the host-pathogen interaction affected by this 5 0 9
response. If we consider specifically the scenarios resulting in fixation of resistance (in the 5 1 2 sense of 100% of the population being resistant), we observe that such a fixation never infected by rust fungi [11] . The existence of a negative feedback between the prevalence 5 1 7 2 5
of resistant hosts and their fitness advantage may indeed limit the evolution of 5 1 8 resistance [11, 12] .
1 9
For the inducible defence, our study shows that fixation can occur not only for a 5 2 0 non-costly one but also when the cost remains below a certain threshold. This is valid 5 2 1 both for an altruistic and a recovery-boosting resistance. When the resistance is 5 2 2 affecting transmission, it can only lead to fixation for small neighbourhood situations 5 2 3
for limited values of the cost. When the defence mechanism boosts recovery, fixation 5 2 4
can occur at higher costs and for the different sizes of neighbourhood. This is obviously 5 2 5
an advantage over a constitutive resistance mechanism. Similarly, one might speculate 5 2 6
that transmission-blocking resistance mechanisms, since they do not protect the host 5 2 7
from infection, create conditions that are comparatively more detrimental to susceptible 5 2 8
competitors, offering an additional benefit. This is reminiscent of comparable effects 5 2 9
that have been discussed in the context of the evolution of tolerance [13] .
3 0
In broad evolutionary terms, the two types of inducible defence considered in this [6] can be selected and even become fixed or at least maintained when interactions are Importantly, the success of strategies based on a mixture of constitutive and 5 4 6 inducible responses (e.g. Figure 5 ) highlights the possible emergence of a resistance 5 4 7
polymorphism, despite the presence on a single parasite (as opposed to a community of 5 4 8 parasites infecting the host, which is likely to be the norm in natural systems). In under those conditions where investment is split between these two mechanisms, both reintroduction of the parasite, as it leaves the host population uninfected and 5 5 7 susceptible.
8
As with any model, whether mathematical or not, our assumptions and equations 5 5 9
cannot fully capture the complexity of the epidemiological processes. Our results derive strategies that potentially could not persist in a non-spatial system. Second, as a 6 3 0 corollary, it emphasises how essential it is to better understand the maintenance of The results of this study could also be informative for more applied purposes. This 6 3 4 approach could indeed be useful in defining the desired characteristics of an engineered 6 3 5
resistance that could be used in a pest control strategy relying on an added resistance 6 3 6 mechanism [31], which would have to cope with the already existing natural immune 6 3 7
responses of the host (e.g. genetically modified mosquitoes able to resist malaria). Moreover, considering an engineered resistance based on a mixed-strategy would have 6 3 9 several advantages. First, it should limit the evolution of parasites able to avoid the 6 4 0 resistance mechanism. Second, it could permit to get rid of the parasite while 6 4 1 simultaneously avoiding the maintenance of an engineered resistance in the population. resistant to a pathogen (as discussed for example in [32]).
4 5
Overall, it appears clearly that taking into account the spatial structure of host-6 4 6
parasite system is essential to better understand the causes that lead to host 6 4 7 heterogeneity in nature [33, 34] . Moreover, and as shown previously [34] , the 6 4 8
contrasting outcomes between various spatial structures are clearly depending on the 6 4 9
cost of resistance but also on the type of response against a pathogen. Concerning the 6 5 0 question of cost, the existence of a density-dependant reproduction leads to a lower 6 5 1 fitness cost in a spatial setting as shown previously [36] . In that context, our results 6 5 2 should permit to better understand the spatial, epidemiological and evolutionary 6 5 3 dynamics of infectious diseases, while also highlighting the need for further 
